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Summary 
While summits are well served in the literature on diplomacy the focus tends to be on 
specific, high profile occasions like Munich and Yalta or on the broad experience of 
multilateral conferences. Such approaches may obscure the full range of summits that 
were taking place by the later twentieth century. By focusing on a four-year period in the 
experience of a particular leader this article aims to provide a case study of summitry, 
which might serve as the basis for comparisons with other countries and time periods. It 
draws out the frequency, type and geographical range of summits experienced by Edward 
Heath as British premier and, in doing so, also raises issues about how types of summits 
are defined, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral meetings and the way 
summitry evolved as a diplomatic practice. In particular it emerges that summits were 
frequent and often perfunctory affairs, sometimes held as a simple courtesy to leaders 
who were passing through London. In this sense the British experience may have been 
unusual but it is also evident, from the number of Heath’s interlocutors and the 
multilateral conferences he attended, that summits had become an integral part of 
political life for world leaders in the jet age. 
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Summit meetings between executive heads of state and government are quite well served 
in the literature on diplomatic practice. In addition to historical accounts of some 
conferences, there are works that take a more analytical approach, not least the collection 
of essays edited by David Dunn which, while looking at a few examples of ad hoc 
meetings, focuses on institutionalised summits like the Group of Seven, European 
Community (EC) and Non-Aligned Movement.1 But such research tends to take a narrow 
approach in terms of the types of summit addressed. Usually attention is focused on the 
great powers or major international organisations, high profile gatherings whose growing 
importance in the diplomacy of the last century is so striking. The current article takes a 
rather different view, one that is narrow in a chronological sense but broad in the types of 
summit it embraces. Rather than looking at the more obvious examples of summitry, it 
adopts a ‘bottom up’ approach. It aims to provide a case study of a particular 
government, that of Britain’s Conservatives under Edward Heath, between June 1970 and 
February 1974.2 This is a suitable period, neither too long nor too short, to get a full idea 
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of the pattern of summits – their number, frequency, type and geographical spread – 
experienced by one head of government in the later twentieth century.  
 
It is not intended that this period should tell us anything ‘special’ about summitry. 
Indeed, if it were full of exceptional circumstances and unusual examples, this would 
undermine the object of taking a clearly defined period, of reasonable length, in the 
diplomatic practice of a particular country and looking at what it reveals about 
conferences at ‘the highest level.’ The article contends that the frequency of summits was 
so great by then that the practice had become quite mundane and that many different 
types of summit could be discerned. The pattern and processes of summitry for any 
country in a particular period will be unique; but this survey of British experience in 
1970-74 might serve as the basis for future case studies, which in turn will allow 
comparisons to be drawn between different countries and periods. After a brief look at 
the way in which summits have been defined and sub-divided into types, the article will 
deal with several kinds of bilateral meeting before turning to multilateral examples, then 
looking at some that are not easily categorised. At the same time it will raise issues about 
how types of summits are best categorised, the relationship between bilateral and 
multilateral meetings and the way in which summitry continued to evolve. 
 
Summits: definition, types and value 
David Dunn has defined ‘summits’ as face-to-face meetings between leaders ‘at the 
highest possible level’, that is among individuals who, ‘by virtue of their position… are 
not able to be contradicted by any other individual.’ Usually this definition implies heads 
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of state and government, but it can also mean heads of international organisations (of 
whom Heath met several) and factions in civil wars (of whom Heath met only one, 
Mujib-ur-Rahmann, the leader of ‘Bangladesh’, who came to London in January 19723). 
Dunn adds the caveat that summits are not necessarily more significant than other forms 
of communication: the definition is there for analytical purposes. Thus Heath’s meeting 
with the French President, Georges Pompidou in May 1971, which helped pave the way 
for EC membership, shares the title with the talk, ‘mainly of a social nature’, between 
Heath and President Haammar de Roburt of the Pacific ‘microstate’ of Nauru three 
months later.4 On the other hand, where governments have an executive Head of State, 
the term ‘summit’ should not be used for meetings with their Prime Ministers, however 
powerful they may be. So Heath’s meeting with premier Hoveyda of Iran in April 1973, 
which included an audience with the Queen, was not a summit because the executive 
head of the Iranian government was the Shah.5 
 
Since 1919 summits have become widespread thanks to improved 
communications, the coming of an interdependent world economy, the democratisation of 
diplomacy and the desire of politicians to be seen to be in control of events. The 
arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ them can be briefly summarised. On one hand, it can be 
argued that politicians are vain, lacking diplomatic experience, unable to escape media 
attention, oversensitive in dealing with other leaders and faced with gruelling schedules. 
They may trample on diplomatic niceties, be satisfied with illusory ‘breakthroughs’ and 
treat summits as occasions for mere publicity-seeking. If one leader develops a personal 
dislike of the other, makes a gaffe or fails to treat an issue seriously then a summit may 
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worsen relations. Each side is under pressure to produce a ‘result’ in a limited period. On 
the other hand, because summits are carried out ‘at the highest level’ they carry particular 
weight if a genuine breakthrough is achieved. A successful meeting can be good 
publicity, not only for the leaders involved, but for the organisations of which they are 
members and the agreements signed.  Summits show electorates that leaders are trying to 
shape the world in a positive way and they may solemnise a country’s commitment to a 
particular relationship. Furthermore, the dangers can be minimised: if they are well-
prepared and used to sign agreements that have been completed in advance then the 
chances of embarrassment are reduced; expectations of a spectacular result can be 
discounted if they are advertised as an ‘exchange of view’; while institutionalised 
summits held at regular intervals can reduce expectations of dramatic change.6 Then 
again, even the most careful preparations have not prevented some high profile failures.7 
 
Geoffrey Berridge argues for the need to classify summits by type in order to 
clarify their value. ‘Serial’ (or institutionalised) summits are often multilateral and linked 
to international organisations, but may play an important role in certain bilateral 
relationships. In either case there is already a mutual interest in a successful relationship 
between the states involved. Since they are regular they encourage leaders to educate 
themselves about ongoing issues and allow them to get to know their opposite numbers. 
Such summits help maintain diplomatic momentum on issues over a period of time, allow 
a range of issues to be linked in ‘package deals’ and act as a final ‘court of appeal’ in 
disputes. Ad hoc summits tend to be shorter, allow little time for negotiation, may draw 
greater publicity and serve more as symbolic events than opportunities for proper 
 6 
negotiation. Since they are one-off occasions, however, they can force issues to be 
addressed. ‘Exchange of view’ summits are short meetings, which typically take place on 
much longer overseas visits by leaders. They may have value for building friendships and 
promoting a country’s trade but provide little opportunity for real negotiation.8 This 
three-fold classification will be used below to order the analysis of the Heath period, but 
it will also be seen that certain summits do not easily fit into Berridge’s categories and 
that, in cases of multilateral summits, his typology can usefully be supplemented by a 
division into global and regional gatherings. 
 
The Heath Case: general 
Summits were the most numerous meetings Heath had with visiting political figures 
during his premiership. Focusing on bilateral meetings on British soil, as traced in the 
Prime Minister’s Office files: in 1971 he hosted thirty-one summits and was visited by 
twenty-eight other overseas politicians (including eleven foreign ministers); in 1972 the 
figures were thirty-five summits and twenty-one meetings with other political figures 
(including six foreign ministers); and in 1973 he saw twenty-nine visiting leaders and 
twenty other political visitors (including seven foreign ministers). The Prime Minister’s 
time was precious and meetings with visitors below leaders’ level needed special 
justification. Thus Heath’s numerous meetings with Jean Monnet, secretary-general of 
the Action Committee on United Europe, reflected their personal acquaintance and the 
Prime Minister’s determination to get into the EC.9 Heath also generally saw the US 
National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger over a meal whenever the latter was in 
London.10 In contrast, Heath’s premiership saw some of the bleakest years in post-war 
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Anglo-Soviet relations and, while visits to Eastern Europe were discussed in 1972, they 
could not be fitted into a busy timetable. This timetable included not only summits and 
political commitments in government, parliament and the Conservative Party, but also 
Heath’s yacht-racing interests and holidays.11 Partly because of problems in timetabling 
long meetings, even when summits did occur the most meaningful talks were often not 
with Heath himself but when the Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, became 
involved and the discussion turned to specifics. When Uganda’s Idi Amin visited London 
at short notice in July 1971, on his first foreign visit as President, his dinner with Heath 
passed uneventfully. It was in an ensuing talk with Douglas-Home that Amin revealed his 
irrational side – asking for British help against an expected Chinese invasion!12 
 
In common with most other countries the British used summits to build certain 
relationships and this helps to explain why Heath was ready to see leaders who may, on 
the surface, seem unlikely policy priorities. He met Kofi Busia of Ghana three times in 
less than twelve months, partly because London wanted to boost the position of this pro-
British leader, who had been elected in 1969 following a period of military rule.13 In 
1972 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) successfully pressed Heath to meet 
the President of the United Arab Emirates because it was in British interests to see the 
Gulf sheikhdoms, previously under British tutelage, improve their relations with Iran.14 
And in November 1973 Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia was invited to see Heath, when 
passing through London on his way back from America, because an ‘element of high 
level personal contact’ was something ‘to which the Yugoslavs attach great importance.’ 
The symbolic importance of meetings was underlined by the steering brief that told 
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Heath, ‘personal and ceremonial aspects of the visit will… be as important as the actual 
talks.’15  
 
All possible was done to minimise controversy at summit level. For one thing, the 
British tried to avoid any rebuffs in suggesting meetings: when Richard Nixon went to 
Moscow in May 1972 the British considered asking him to stop off in London. On 
reflection, however, it was felt he was likely to refuse because of his busy schedule, so 
the invitation was never put.16 When summits were held, great care was taken even over 
such questions as what food to serve. When Busia visited, Downing Street consulted both 
the Ghanaian government and the Treasury Medical Advisers about the appropriate meals 
to serve, because he was diabetic. But it was not always easy to discover what was best 
served up: when Albert Bongo of Gabon visited London the FCO was informed by its 
embassy in Yaounde that ‘Madame Bongo is said by protocol not to drink alcohol and by 
our diplomatic colleagues to enjoy a glass of champagne.’17 With such careful attention 
to detail, meetings held in at atmosphere of crisis were surprisingly rare, helping ensure 
that most took place with a minimum of media attention. Leaving aside the special case 
of Northern Ireland, which was partly an ‘domestic’ British problem, there were very few 
‘crisis’ summits. One, in September 1971, was the visit of Malta’s Dom Mintoff, who 
wanted compensation for the British decision to withdraw its military forces from the 
island.18 He was back again six months later for a summit that confirmed the deadlock 
between the two sides.19 The other ‘crisis’ summit was with Icelandic premier Olafur 
Johannesson, in October 1973, which achieved something of a breakthrough in the ‘cod 
war’ between the two countries over fishing limits.20 
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 One significant feature of Britain’s position was that, whatever its reduced 
position since 1945, it remained an important destination for foreign leaders. Heath made 
quite regular visits abroad but the vast majority of his summits took place in London. 
True, with major partners like Germany and Italy there was an expectation that heads of 
government would alternate in visiting each other’s country and it was an indication of 
the rising economic power of Japan that, in September 1972, Heath became the first 
British Prime Minister to visit Tokyo.21 Britain’s power relative to many less developed 
countries, as well as its importance as an aid donor, trading nation and arms exporter 
undoubtedly helped make it a port of call for ‘third world’ leaders. It also continued to 
gain from its imperial heritage: indeed slightly more than a third of the summits hosted 
by Heath were with Commonwealth leaders. None of these seem to have expected the 
British Prime Minister to reciprocate with a visit to them. Instead, the leaders of 
Mauritius, Jamaica or Ghana were happy to visit Heath several times, without him 
reciprocating. 
 
‘Exchanges of View’ 
This leads to the first kind of summit that deserves discussion. An important reason why 
Britain became a frequent destination for foreign leaders was its position in global 
communications. If the growth of summitry itself was closely linked improved transport, 
it is not surprising that Heathrow airport’s position as the world’s largest international 
airport regularly brought Presidents and Prime Ministers there. Many of them met Heath 
more than once, even if he did manage to omit meeting leaders from certain geographical 
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areas (including Eastern Europe, Latin America and non-Commonwealth Africa). The 
Prime Minister’s country house at Chequers was even more convenient for Heathrow 
than was Downing Street. But most summits took place at the latter, partly because this 
was easier to fit into Heath’s daily timetable and partly because visiting leaders often 
stayed overnight at their embassy in London. While Chequers offered more pleasant 
surroundings and was often used for visitors who were meeting Heath at the weekend, or 
who were holding discussions with him over more than one day, a meeting there did not 
necessarily signify that it was more significant than a conference in Downing Street. This 
was not the equivalent to, say, an invitation by the US President to Camp David. In 1971 
for example Heath met the Jamaican premier, Hugh Shearer, for a lunch at Chequers that 
was mainly devoted to problems in the island’s sugar industry.22  
 
London’s position as a frequent ‘port of call’ also benefited from the reputation of 
its medical care and education system, and when foreign leaders came to consult 
physicians or visit their children at school it was prudent to arrange summits with them. 
The fact that Seewcosugar Rangoolam of Mauritius, had children being educated in 
Dublin, helps explain why he was one of the most frequent visiting Prime Ministers in 
these years.23 Heath’s only meeting with the King Tupou IV, absolute ruler of Tonga, 
was when he brought his son to school in Cambridge.24 The Burmese leader, Ne Win, 
was in Britain for hospital treatment in late 1970, for a check-up in October 1971 and to 
accompany his wife in Summer 1972 hospitalised. On all three occasions Heath offered 
to meet the General and he was twice taken up, though on neither occasion did they 
discuss anything of substance.25 Rather different was Souvanna Phouma of Laos, who 
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took annual holidays in France (the former colonial power in Laos) and linked these to a 
visit to London, largely because of Britain’s role as co-chair of the Geneva Conference 
on Indochina.26  
 
It was often difficult to deny a meeting if leaders pressed for one. Thus, when the 
autocratic and volatile Gabonese President Bongo arrived in 1970, mainly to attract 
British firms to invest in his country, it hardly seemed worth Heath’s time to meet him. 
The President carried little weight in African affairs and was heavily under French 
influence. But Bongo wanted a meeting and Downing Street neatly solved the dilemma 
by having Heath drop into two receptions that were being held for the President, who – 
incidentally - was on his first ever visit to a foreign capital.27 In 1971 Lee Kuan Yew of 
Singapore, who visited Britain almost annually for various reasons (his son was at 
Cambridge), was due to receive honorary degrees from both Liverpool and Sheffield 
Universities. While the FCO had ‘no specific business to do’ they did wish to ‘renew our 
good understanding with him’ and to this end Heath gave him dinner.28 Such meetings 
fall within Berridge’s category of ‘exchanges of view’ though, given the main British 
motive for holding them, they might better be termed ‘courtesy summits’ 
 
There were few examples of Heath combining summits with other commitments 
when he travelled abroad. At the time of the Munich Olympic Games he went to Bavaria, 
meeting both Germany’s Willy Brandt and Ireland’s Jack Lynch29; in May 1973 he made 
another private visit to Bavaria, taking the opportunity to stop in Bonn to see Brandt 
again30; and in December 1973, when he went to Brussels to speak at the inauguration of 
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the Spaak Foundation, he met the Belgian and Luxembourg prime ministers. Such 
summits, while they were short and often amounted to no more than a chat over a meal, 
could on occasions prove valuable especially if they happened to coincide with problems 
elsewhere: Heath was able to discuss an upcoming EC summit on his Brussels visit.31 
 
State Visits 
No-one would question that if executive leaders meet in the course of state visits then 
these should be considered as summits. But not all visiting Heads of State will be the 
‘highest’ executive authority in their country and in the British case, of course, it is the 
Prime Minister rather than the Queen who is the political ‘leader’. Furthermore, even if 
two executive figures are brought together on such occasions, state visits ‘provide one of 
the few areas of diplomatic activity which have seen but little relaxation of the formality 
of protocol.’32 The process is surrounded by numerous rules, from the need to provide 
lavish gifts to the provision of large-scale formal dinners, all of which makes it difficult 
to pursue serious political business. Under Heath at least, four of the eight state visits 
were by a monarch or President who was not their country’s executive leader (Japan, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and West Germany). Neither were any of these four 
accompanied by their head of government, so no ‘summit’ took place.  
 
In December 1971 there was a state visit by the King of Afghanistan, Mohammed 
Zahir Shah, who was considered his country’s executive head of government, so that this 
can also be considered a summit. He had been invited because ‘we wish to encourage the 
Afghans to resist growing Soviet influence’ and, quite fortuitously, his arrival coincided 
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with the Indo-Pakistani War, which became the main subject of his conversation with 
Heath. Then again, the visit did nothing to prevent Afghanistan’s increasing domination 
by Moscow over the following years.33 The next visit by an executive Head of State was 
President Luis Echeverria of Mexico in April 1973. He was invited to Downing Street for 
lunch, as was Nigeria’s Yakubu Gowon a few months later. But with neither of these 
leaders was there anything of particular import to discuss.34 In December, 1973 President 
Joseph Mobutu of Zaire became the fourth and final executive Head of State to visit 
Britain under Heath, but there is no record of him meeting the Prime Minister for a 
formal discussion.35 It cannot be pretended then that, in this period at least, summits in 
the context of state visits were of any real importance. This was not because the British 
were unaware of the value of state visits: an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations 
was signified by the visit of Emperor Hirohito in 1971, the first time he had left Japan as 
head of state. But state visits seem to have been a time for avoiding controversy and it is 
not surprising that they saw little in the way of serious negotiation. 
 
Serial, ‘working’ bilateral summits 
If practice under Heath is any guide, it is not easy to divide summits into ‘serial’ and ‘ad 
hoc’ varieties. Some courtesy meetings, most obviously those involving Seewoosagur 
Ramgoolam of Mauritius who met Heath six times, took on a ‘serial’ nature but hardly 
fulfil Berridge’s criteria for the value of such summits. In order to find examples of 
regular meetings that encouraged leaders to educate themselves about problems, 
maintained momentum on policies and allowed diverse issues to be linked in ‘package 
deals’, analysis needs to concentrate on what are sometimes called ‘official, working’ 
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meetings. These are usually planned well in advance, take up several hours of talks, 
sometimes over more than one day, and see the principals meeting at fairly regular 
intervals. The key examples in 1970-74 were meetings with the leaders of the United 
States and EC member states. 
 
These years are usually seen as a barren period for the alliance between London 
and Washington, with Heath trying to play down the idea of a ‘special relationship’ as he 
tried to enter the EC, while the Americans took a series of initiatives that offended their 
European allies, not least with the ‘Nixon shock’ economic measures of 1971 and the 
launch of ‘the Year of Europe’ in 1973.36 Yet, the record of summits in 1970-74 reveals 
them to have been successful and friendly, suggesting that the ‘special relationship’ was 
in better health than generally thought. The President’s brief visit to Britain in October 
1970 got the Heath-Nixon years off on a sound footing, with the Prime Minister inviting 
the President to Chequers, where the latter emphasised the value of personal encounters 
to the ‘special relationship’.37 At their first ‘formal’ summit in December 1970 – a two-
day affair, with meetings at the White House and Camp David – Heath preferred to speak 
of a ‘natural relationship’; but the talks were friendly enough and Nixon was grateful for 
Heath’s support on the Vietnam War.38 These meetings go against the impression given 
in Kissinger’s memoirs that the Nixon-Heath relationship ‘never flourished’. Heath, 
while he put membership of the EC at the centre of his foreign policy, was determined 
not to let this undermine relations with America.39  
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During 1971 strains became more apparent, especially with the so-called ‘Nixon 
shock’. In mid-October Washington made an intriguing suggestion to the British that a 
multilateral Western summit be held to address the accompanying problems of monetary 
instability and economic uncertainty. But the British raised two difficulties: who should 
be invited? And would the public not be disappointed if the meeting proved unable to 
agree on a solution to the monetary crisis?40 The upshot was a frank exchange between 
the British Ambassador, Lord Cromer, and Kissinger in which the National Security 
Adviser suggested a bilateral meeting, to be held in Bermuda, a British territory.41 In fact, 
as well as Heath, Nixon saw both Pompidou of France and Brandt of Germany in 
separate summits in December, so that an element of multilateral activity survived.42 The 
Bermuda summit passed off successfully enough, the need to focus on the vexed 
monetary crisis having been reduced by a meeting of the Group of Ten leading western 
economies a few days before.43  
 
The relationship seemed safely back on track in February 1973, when Heath 
became the first foreign leader to visit Nixon during his second term. ‘Nixon went out of 
his way to mark the Prime Minister’s visit as something different from the ordinary run 
of such affairs’, setting aside considerable time and even coming to the British embassy 
for lunch. The Embassy felt it ‘an outstanding success’ that ‘clearly consolidated’ 
personal relations at the top.44 The real buffeting of the relationship came later in 1973, 
with Kissinger’s self-proclaimed ‘Year of Europe’ and transatlantic differences over the 
October 1973 Middle East War. In this period there were no summits to help lift the 
gloom; and since Heath left office before he was able to see Nixon again this may explain 
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while the whole Heath years were unjustly remembered as ones of difficulty for the 
British alliance with America. 
 
Incidentally, one beneficiary of the frequent Prime Ministerial visits to 
Washington was the British-Canadian relationship, since Ottowa was almost always a 
stopping off point on the way to, or from, the US. This was a unique example of Heath 
visiting a country more frequently than he was visited by its leader, but this was because 
of simple convenience, and Canada’s position in the Commonwealth and NATO, rather 
than because of any power it had. The only visit by Trudeau to London under Heath was 
in December 1972.45 
 
It has long been understood that Heath’s summit with Pompidou was central to 
his success in getting Britain into the EC and that that aim itself was central to his whole 
foreign policy.46 Even before entering the EC, the British tried to use meetings with 
member governments to encourage supporters (the Dutch, Belgians and Italians), keep in 
step with other applicants (Ireland, Denmark and Norway) and win over the French. By 
early 1971 a Heath-Pompidou meeting was being discussed. But the very fact that Heath 
made such a summit central to his entry bid – an occasion where he personally hoped to 
win Pompidou over to British membership - meant that planning it was a delicate matter, 
If he refused to meet, or if the summit ended in failure, it could have proved 
cataclysmic.47 Even when, in late March, Pompidou said he definitely wanted a summit, 
the British continued to worry. The date suggested, 21 May, was many weeks away and it 
was feared that, in the interim, the talks on entry in Brussels would be slowed down, 
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perhaps creating an atmosphere of crisis. Also, a summit might upset other members of 
the EC, who would be resentful of decisions being taken from their hands. Then again, 
once Pompidou had suggested a meeting it was almost impossible not to go ahead.48 To 
dampen the sense of expectation, when the summit was formally announced, the British 
tried to play down its significance by pointing out that Heath had just seen Brandt and 
would soon be meeting Italy’s Emilio Colombo.49 As it transpired, the Paris summit 
proved one of the most significant and successful of the period with Pompidou, now 
convinced of Heath’s commitment to a European future, agreeing that the entry talks 
should move swiftly to their conclusion.50 
 
Once Britain was inside the Community, and notwithstanding the development of 
multilateral summits, it is important to note that bilateral meetings still remained 
significant for keeping the member governments in unison. Heath continued to lay great 
emphasis on the relationship with Pompidou, maintaining direct contacts between 
Downing Street and the Elysee.51 In his report on the British-French summit of May 
1973, when the two leaders met alone for more than nine hours, the Ambassador to Paris, 
Edward Tomkins, emphasised the importance of such meetings: ‘multilateral processes 
do not preclude the need for a web of confidences woven bilaterally among the leaders, 
and more particularly with the country which is at the same time the most difficult and 
the nearest and the most necessary of our partners.’ Each of the Heath-Pompidou 
summits, going back to 1971 – they also met in March 1972 - had come after a difficult 
phase in relations but the President usually softened his line after a face-to-face meeting, 
where his own significance was underlined.52 France was not the only target of bilateral 
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meetings to smooth multilateral business in the EC. In November 1973, when the 
German and Dutch leaders both visited London, preparations for the multilateral 
Community summit in Copenhagen were high on the agenda.53 In fact, in November-
December 1973 Heath saw all the other eight leaders of the Community in bilateral 
meetings. However, to understand the full significance of summits as a means of doing 
business in the enlarged European Community also requires a look at multilateral 
examples. 
 
Multilateral Summits: general 
The dynamics of a meeting between two leaders are markedly less complex than those 
between several. Unless they are bitter rivals, the agenda, timetable and accompanying 
ceremonies should be easier to arrange bilaterally than at multilateral conferences, issues 
of language translation will be simpler and the draft communiqué will be less prone to 
dispute. Then again, the number of leaders who might be present at a multilateral summit 
– anything from three to more than a hundred – quite clearly makes this rather an 
amorphous ‘type’. Indeed, it seems essential to sub-divide them  and to acknowledge that 
multilateral meetings differ greatly, in the kind of items discussed and the familiarity of 
the leaders with one another, depending on whether they are: serial summits (as with the 
EC, which began regular meetings in 1975) or ad hoc gatherings (like summit that 
celebrated twenty-five years of the UN in 1970); and also whether they are ‘regional’ 
meetings (like the EC again) or ‘global’ in character (like the Commonwealth and UN). 
Regional organisations and alliances will have a greater sense of common identity and a 
better defined agenda for discussion than global bodies, so that agreement may be easier 
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to reach. It is also clear that certain special types of multilateral summit exist, not linked 
to any international organisation. Some are ad hoc gatherings linked to a particular topic, 
such as the early East-West summits during the Cold War. Others may be ceremonial 
such as those summits that may take place at major funerals.  
 
The Commonwealth: multilateral and global 
The main, regular multilateral conference that British leaders took part in when Heath 
took power was that of the Commonwealth, which was about to hold its first regular 
session outside the United Kingdom, in Singapore. Ironically, on entering Downing 
Street in June 1970, Heath was ‘rather gloomy about finding something useful to talk 
about at the Conference…’54 A subject soon appeared, but hardly one to his taste, when 
Commonwealth leaders persistently condemned the Conservatives’ decision, announced 
in July, to renew certain arms sales to South Africa.55 The issue dominated bilateral 
exchanges with Commonwealth leaders over the following months and was the focus of a 
multilateral meeting with a delegation from the Organisation of African Unity, led by 
Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda.56 By December officials recognised that it was impossible to 
escape being ‘put in the dock’ and the conference proved as unpleasant as Heath had 
feared. The tone of his report to Cabinet was quite patronising: the conference ‘had been 
a trying and, at times, unpleasant experience. But we had made some progress towards… 
establishing Commonwealth relations on a more mature and less irresponsible basis.’57 
This multilateral gathering provided the opportunity for various bilateral summits. Not 
only did Heath visit Cyprus, Pakistan, India and Malaysia on the outward journey, but he 
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also met Canada’s Pierre Trudeau in New Delhi and had several bilateral meetings in 
Singapore.58  
 
The Singapore experience provoked discussion about the organisation of future 
Commonwealth gatherings, which is revealing of approaches to multilateral summits. 
Heath wrote to Pierre Trudeau soon after Singapore, acknowledging the ‘obvious strength 
of feeling’ that the Commonwealth should continue, but complaining that it had been ‘a 
shock to me to find to what extent numbers of our colleagues seemed to have abandoned 
altogether any practice of holding informal private discussions.’ The reliance on large, 
formal gatherings had only helped amplify the danger of bitter arguments and, as far as 
Heath could see, restricted sessions were the only place where real progress was 
possible.59 It was agreed, at Singapore itself, to ask the Commonwealth Secretary-
General, Arnold Smith, to look into such problems and there was a meeting of senior 
officials to discuss future procedure at Ottowa in October 1972. The meeting 
recommended that future conferences should still last a week or so, but with a shorter 
agenda, a focus on ‘executive sessions’ of leaders and their key advisers, the use of 
restricted sessions on delicate issues, attention to the size and shape of tables – to make 
discussions comfortable and intimate - and careful press arrangements. Burke Trend, the 
Secretary of the Cabinet, who represented Britain, was content enough with the report 
though he noted that it was really up to leaders themselves whether any system worked 
well.60  
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The Prime Minister was less happy, launching into a tirade against the whole way 
such gatherings were currently organised. He wanted ‘to place firmly on record’ his view 
that leaders’ meetings should only be held ‘for a specific purpose, agreed beforehand’; 
planning them months in advance for ‘a general chat is, in fact, meaningless’ and put 
them at the mercy of chance events. It was ‘nonsensical in modern times to expect Heads 
of Government to spend eight working days, plus a weekend, plus travelling time… at 
such Conferences’ and he drew an unflattering comparison between Commonwealth 
practice and the recent Paris summit of the enlarged EEC: ‘if nine Heads of Government 
can settle the course of the European Community for the rest of this decade in two days, 
there is no excuse at all for this old-fashioned type of prolonged jamboree.’ He 
particularly attacked the Commonwealth’s traditional general discussion as ‘useless’ and 
argued that the debate on co-operation was simply an occasion when ‘everyone scratches 
madly around trying to think of some gimmick…’ By meeting for specific reasons, 
planning policy initiatives in advance and removing unnecessary paraphernalia Heath 
believed Commonwealth conferences could be cut to two or three days.61 If nothing else, 
this is interesting evidence that the Prime Minister thought explicitly about summits, their 
value as a way of doing business and ways of making them more effective.  
 
In this debate, Heath soon found himself at odds even with close allies. Trudeau 
was a convinced that, however busy leaders were, there were important questions to 
discuss and: 
‘a curtailed conference would, by its very brevity, expose us all to an atmosphere 
of crisis, with little time left for all the informality and relaxed atmosphere needed 
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for the exchange of views on practical matters… The mid-conference weekend 
has in the past been very useful as a quiet spell for digestion and reconciliation of 
points of view at both the Prime Ministerial and official level.’62 
In fact, the next Commonwealth heads of government meeting, hosted by Trudeau 
himself in Ottowa in May 1973, proved a success. In a bilateral meeting at the end of the 
conference with Jamaica’s Michael Manley, even Heath agreed that it had restored 
confidence in the leaders’ meeting, though he complained that more could still be done 
beforehand to ensure meaningful discussion.63  
 
The European Community: multilateral and regional 
What then of multilateral summits in the EC context? In July 1971, with the path to entry 
cleared, Heath hoped that a summit meeting of existing and new members could be held 
between the treaty signature and actual entry. A gathering ‘at the highest level’ he 
explained, could set the ‘broad lines along which we propose to tackle the problems 
which face us all’ and, implying a need for similar gatherings in future, he talked of 
‘continuing consultation’ being necessary.64 Actually, he was pushing at an open door: 
Pompidou and Brandt had already discussed the possibility of a summit of the enlarged 
Community. The Paris summit of October 1972 was preceded by considerable 
preparations at national level, through bilateral contacts and via the work of EEC 
institutions, with a considerable range of views on what should be done.65 Once in Paris, 
Heath had the inevitable series of bilateral meetings with his fellow leaders.66 But it was 
at the multilateral level, in only two days, that the EC set an ambitious programme for the 
future, aiming to create a political union and a common currency by 1980. Heath was 
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deeply committed to this vision and, as seen above, drew a stark contrast between the 
success of the Paris summit and the supposed inefficiencies of Commonwealth 
summits.67 But the following months saw the enthusiasm of Paris dissipate remarkably 
quickly. It was less easy to make practical progress on issues than to make ambitious 
directives and the challenge of expanding the EC to nine members was difficult enough. 
Key challenges of inflation, energy supplies and the drafting of a regional policy 
absorbed considerable attention over the coming year and helped delay institutional 
reform.  
 
A sense of progress only returned in September 1973 when Jean Monnet, the so-
called ‘father of Europe’, put a memorandum to Heath, Pompidou and Brandt urging the 
creation of a ‘Provisional European Government or Supreme Council.’ Regular, frequent 
summits could do much to push EC strategy forward. Both Heath and Brandt responded 
enthusiastically. Pompidou said nothing immediately but did talk, at a press conference 
late in the month, of ‘les hauts responsables’ taking a lead in pushing political co-
operation forward.68 It was planned to discuss the proposal at another Community 
summit, set for December in Copenhagen. In bilateral meetings with leaders of the 
smaller EC members Heath tried to dispel the suspicion among smaller members that 
regular summits were a means for France, West Germany and Britain to dominate the 
Community.69 But by December another threat was looming: the aftermath of the 
October Middle East War and, in particular, the tripling of oil prices, was threatening to 
divide the EC as each country tried to protect its own position.70  
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Ironically, given Heath’s earlier praise for the Paris summit and criticism of 
Commonwealth meetings, Copenhagen proved a disaster. Rather than focusing on putting 
the Paris programme back on track it was dominated by the energy crisis, with ministers 
from oil producing countries arriving uninvited in the Danish capital. The likely financial 
impact of oil price increases meant that Brandt wanted no progress towards a Regional 
Development Fund, which was one of Heath’s key aims. To make matters worse, the 
Danish premier was preoccupied with forming a new coalition. But the problems were 
not all down to unfortunate circumstances. Heath conceded that one problem was the way 
smaller governments, in order to protect their own position, had pushed the summit away 
from the original Anglo-French vision of a small, informal gathering of key leaders.71 In 
Cabinet, Heath said that, in future, summits must be ‘organised in a productive manner.’ 
His memoirs were more frank: ‘It was the worst summit that I ever experienced.’72 Two 
months later, Heath’s government was defeated in a hastily-called election and it was left 
to an incoming Labour government to deal with the creation of the European Council, as 
the system of regular Community summits became known. 
 
‘Working Funerals’ 
A distinct type of multilateral summit is the ‘working funeral’ following the death of 
some major political leader. Like ad hoc summits, these are an irregular occurrence, but 
they have a well-established procedure involving a ceremony, a meeting with 
representatives of the host government and an opportunity for discussions with other 
leaders. By nature they are hastily planned and allow little time for formal talks, but they 
can provide an opportunity for a discreet discussion of any number of issues, without 
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building up public expectation in the way other summits do.73 The 1960s had seen a 
series of such ‘working funerals’, including Kennedy, Churchill, Adenauer and 
Eisenhower.  
 
Unfortunately, the only example of such a large-scale gathering under Heath was 
not, strictly speaking, a funeral at all. When Charles de Gaulle died in November 1970 he 
was buried privately near his home. Nonetheless Britain sent an impressive array of 
mourners to the memorial service in Notre Dame, including Heath and three former 
Prime Ministers.74 The service came at a delicate point in the EEC negotiations and 
provided Heath with an opportune meeting with President Pompidou. Given the pressures 
on the President to greet other visiting leaders, this meeting lasted barely ten minutes but 
was enough to suggest a positive outlook from the new man in the Elysee on British entry 
to the EEC. It also allowed Heath to suggest that Pompidou might make a state visit to 
London at some point.75  
 
Other major figures died over the next few years but none of their funerals proved 
a significant diplomatic event. While Heath did attend the funeral of the former Canadian 
premier, Lester Pearson, in December 1973, he was the only foreign leader to do so. So 
this was actually a rare case of a bilateral ‘working funeral’, though Heath’s talk with 
Trudeau was so brief that no record was kept.76  
 
New Categories of Summit? 
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Erik Goldstein has noted the gathering of certain leaders to celebrate the fiftieth 
anniversary of D-Day in 1994 as a new kind of summit.77 Like funeral summits their 
precise make-up will vary according to circumstances, include ceremonies and 
opportunities to meet other leaders, but they will not be ideal occasions for negotiation. 
Unlike funeral summits their dates will be known in advance and this may allow for some 
planning of meetings on particular purposes. There was one bilateral ‘anniversary’ 
summit involving Britain in 1973. Portugal was a dictatorship, still fighting to hold on to 
its colonial empire and heavily criticised by the Labour Party, but it was also a member 
of NATO and had the honour of being Britain’s oldest ally, a relationship that could be 
traced back to 1373. The 600th anniversary could hardly be ignored and the prime 
minister, Marcello Caetano, was duly invited to London for what proved a controversial 
summit, marked by demonstrations against the regime.78  
 
The only example of a multilateral anniversary summit in this period was to 
celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the UN in October 1970. This drew dozens of 
leaders to New York for several days and allowed Heath to hold bilateral meetings with 
twelve leaders as well as the UN Secretary-General U Thant. Half these meetings 
occurred on 22 October and some were quite short, but there were also some wide-
ranging discussions, notably with Japanese premier Sato, and at least one chance to 
discuss a serious problem (Ulster, with Ireland’s Jack Lynch).79  
 
The idea of a summit being tied to a non-governmental organisation may sound 
absurd. But, an unusual reason for summit meetings in November 1973 was that provided 
 27 
by an emergency conference of the Socialist International in London. It had been called 
to discuss the recent Middle East War and the ensuing oil crisis. The International was a 
non-governmental body and, as a Conservative politician. Heath had no direct interest in 
it but many of its members were incumbent Prime Ministers and no less than four of them 
took the chance to meet him: Golda Meir of Israel (less critical of British policy on the 
Middle East than usual); Dom Mintoff of Malta (noted to be ‘on his best behaviour’); 
Martin den Uyl of the Netherlands; and Willy Brandt of Germany. The last two were able 
to discuss an upcoming EC summit in Copenhagen.80 For those prime ministers 
themselves of course, the Socialist International was a kind of multilateral ‘summit’ - at 
least where it involved those party leaders who were in office.  
 
 Another unusual example of a summit was that at Sunningdale (a civil service 
college in Berkshire, not far from London) in December 1973, which might be described 
as being held in the context of ‘domestic’ politics. For Sunningdale not only involved 
Heath and the Irish premier, Liam Cosgrave, but also politicians from both sides of the 
divide in Northern Ireland. It took place over three days, Heath only attended for part of 
the time (he had to leave to meet the Italian Prime Minister, Mariano Rumor) and it led to 
an ill-fated attempt at power-sharing in Ulster. But it may also serve as an interesting 
example of the way in which summits can evolve over time, with bilateral and 
multilateral encounters becoming enmeshed. Heath had started to develop the idea of 
including an Irish dimension in settling Northern Ireland’s ‘troubles’ when he met an 
earlier Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, in September 1971. This meeting was followed within 
weeks by another that included Northern Ireland’s premier, Brian Faulkner. Heath and 
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Lynch were suspicious of each other at first but Heath claims to have broken the ice 
between them by offering his counterpart a glass of his favourite whiskey. Heath also saw 
it as significant that both Britain and Ireland were about to join the EC, a multilateral 
forum which allowed their leaders to meet more frequently in behind-the-scenes talks at 
bilateral level, where Irish problems could be discussed.81  
 
As a final point in this discussion of summits beyond the established categories, it 
is worth asking whether we need to look beyond David Dunn’s definition of summits. 
Elmer Plischke, has emphasised ‘executive agency’ in defining summitry and extended it 
to include personal communications by heads of state and government. Dunn has argued 
against such a broad definition, pointing out that, even junior diplomats can be said to act 
as ‘agents’ of leaders. He asks how far a leader has to be involved in drafting a message 
for it to become a ‘summit’ communication: most are drafted by officials and simply 
signed off by the leader. Dunn also believes that a leader-to-leader telephone call does 
not carry the commitment of time, energy and political capital that an actual meeting 
does. 82 Leaving aside issue of agency and written communication, which do indeed seem 
to dilute the notion of leader-to-leader contact, it might still reasonably be asked whether 
telephone calls do not act as a form of ‘summit’. It can hardly be denied that they involve 
leaders talking directly and they may last for some time.  
 
The Heath case suggests there is much in favour of Dunn’s argument. It is 
noteworthy that in 1971, when Pierre Trudeau of Canada was forced to cancel a visit to 
London, he and Heath talked on the telephone, but only briefly and their main topic of 
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conversation was when they could meet face-to-face.83 Other examples reinforce the 
point: when, in July 1970, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda rang to protest against the 
revival of British arms sales to South Africa, Heath drew the conversation quickly to a 
close by promising a written reply; and when Heath rang Richard Nixon to congratulate 
him on his re-election as President in November 1972 it was another short call in which 
both expressed hopes of an early face-to-face meeting.84 Telephone calls did require time 
to be set aside (not least when a transatlantic call was planned) and Heath seems to have 
found it easy to talk over the ‘phone with one leader, Willy Brandt.85 Case studies of 
other leaders may add weight to Plischke’s argument: it is certainly possible to envisage a 
leader using lengthy, regular telephone calls to achieve the same aims as summits . But 
Heath was not that leader and conclusions will now be drawn on the basis that Dunn’s 
definition, with its requirement of a face-to-face encounter at ‘the highest level’, holds 
good.  
 
Conclusions 
Analysis of a particular government’s experience can only provide a limited picture of 
the nature of summitry. Not only will one country’s experience differ from others, but 
also any specific time frame will set tend to define the types of summit held. A few 
decades earlier the British Prime Minister would have attended far less summits but he 
would have been at the ‘top table’ alongside the US and USSR. Only a few years after 
Heath lost office, there were far more multilateral summits – European Councils, annual 
meetings of the Group of Eight and ad hoc gatherings of NATO and the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe. Heath’s term may nonetheless serve as a basis for 
 30 
comparison with other countries and periods. What stands out most from his experience 
perhaps, is the sheer frequency with which leaders met, even if he seems to have presided 
over a rather barren period in terms of summits linked to state visits and funerals. But 
many summits proved perfunctory affairs, drawing little or no public attention and raising 
few expectations in advance. In contrast to the impression one might gain from 
concentrating on high-profile conferences, late twentieth century summits had become a 
mundane affair, at least for Britain, a country that foreign leaders found it convenient to 
visit so frequently. Some meetings were little more than a brief chat over a meal. In one 
sense there was a frenzy of summitry; but the reverse side of this was that many meetings 
were instantly forgotten.  
 
Perhaps because they were so numerous, summits had by this time evolved, like 
life itself, into diverse, sometimes unusual forms. While they could be categorised in 
various ways, these often overlapped. Berridge’s threefold division into ad hoc, serial and 
‘exchange of view’ summits serves as a general outline of the basic types, but there also 
needs to be a further division between bilateral and multiateral meetings, with the latter 
further divided into global and regional. Beyond that different analytical points might be 
made depending on whether summits were ‘official, working’ or ‘informal’; whether 
linked to international organisations, state visits, funerals, anniversaries, non-
governmental bodies or even domestic problems. But, for Heath at least, most of these 
meetings at ‘the highest level’ were arranged as mere ‘courtesies’.  
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By surveying a particular historical period it has also become evident that 
complex relationships developed between summits themselves. Sometimes, as with 
Mariano Rumor’s visit at the time of Sunningdale, they clashed with one another, an 
inevitable result perhaps of their growing frequency. But some summits could also help 
pave the way to others, as the road to Sunningdale was cleared in part by bilateral British-
Irish meetings. It is especially important to note the way in which bilateral summits were 
frequently used to prepare for multilateral meetings of the Commonwealth and EC. This 
did not guarantee success, as the examples of Singapore and Copenhagen amply reveal, 
but it seems to have been one reason why the frequency of summits gathered ever-more 
pace. It was almost as if the bilateral ‘summits’ were stages on the road to a still-higher 
level, smaller peaks on the way to Everest Then again, when leaders gathered at 
multilateral summits they became, in part, a series of bilateral summits in which Heath 
could discuss any number of issues with individual conferees. 
 
Partly because of this complex mix, the Heath experience shows the difficulty in 
differentiating between certain types of summit. This is especially the case with 
‘exchange of view’ and official, working meetings. Many visitors to London only met the 
Prime Minister for one-off meetings, but these could range from brief calls to wide-
ranging, significant discussions. When Heath decided to visit several countries en route to 
the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in January 1971, he was able to ‘exchange 
views’ with a number of leaders, on the Cyprus problem with President Makarios for 
example. Yet Heath also markedly improved relations with India, by making the first 
visit of a British Prime Minister there for thirteen years, and he held two days of talks 
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with President Yahya Khan of Pakistan. The British High Commissioners in both 
countries were delighted with the impact of these meetings.86 It is certainly easier to 
categorise serial summits that involved several hours of talks and often lasted more than 
one day, as ‘official, working’ meetings. But ironically many of these seem to have been 
more useful as ‘exchanges of view’ than anything else. Emilio Colombo’s two day visit 
to London in June 1971, for example, included long talks on NATO, détente and the EC 
application, but this amounted to little more than a tour d’horizon. Everyone knew it was 
the Heath-Pompidou summit the previous month that really mattered.87  
 
The main aim behind this article was to provide a survey of summitry under the 
Heath government to serve as a basis for comparison with studies of other leaders, 
countries and time periods. This is not the place to speculate overmuch about what such 
studies will find, but a number of points might usefully be made. Clearly, a number of 
elements that affected Heath’s experience were tied to Britain’s position as a wealthy, 
Western, former colonial power, with a major international airport as well as leading 
medical and educational facilities. It is a safe assumption that no other Prime Minister 
held so many bilateral summits with Commonwealth leaders in this period. Also, the vast 
majority of Heath’s summits were on British soil because the world was, in a sense, 
happy to come to him (and in quite large numbers). While it is likely that this pattern will 
be found with other wealthy, Western powers such as the United States, France or 
Germany; it seems equally probable that many of the world’s leaders will have had 
limited numbers of their fellows passing through and making courtesy calls. In other 
words, Britain was a ‘net importer’ of summits. The corollary was that Heath made far 
 33 
less overseas visits and these were focused on North America and Western Europe – 
where leaders expected a willingness to make mutual exchanges of visit - or were made 
in order to attend the multilateral Commonwealth Conference, of which Britain was a 
leading member.  
 
Nevertheless, British experience reflected general patterns in the development of 
summitry as a diplomatic activity. Even if many other countries did participate in less 
summits and had fewer visiting leaders than Britain, most were evidently meeting one 
another with increasing frequency, fitting regional summits into their schedules and 
trying to make an appearance at the UN. Commonwealth leaders other than Heath 
contemplated the best ways of organising such meetings and summits were becoming 
highly important in certain contexts, not least in EC decision-making. But it will be 
interesting to discover if other leaders found them to be as dull as Heath did by July 1973. 
That month Indira Gandhi saw him for forty-five minutes and the Prime Minister did not 
bother to write a record. ‘You told me afterwards,’ a civil servant noted lamely, ‘that she 
had been tired and… the conversation hadn’t interested you very much.’88 
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Appendix: Table of Summits involving Edward Heath as British Prime Minister, 
June 1970-February 1974. 
‘PM’ is Prime Minister. Unless otherwise stated the place of the meeting was London 
usually at the Prime Minister’s official residence, 10 Downing Street, or his country 
house, Chequers. The closure of certain files and the failure properly to record certain 
meetings mean the list may not be exhaustive. 
 
1970 
14 July: PM Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius. 
14 July: Tunku Abdul Rahmann of Malaysia. 
4 September: PM Forbes Burnham of Guyana. 
8 September: Arnold Smith, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. 
3 October: President Richard Nixon of the United States. 
13 October: PM Souvanna Phouma of Laos. 
16 October: PM Kofi Busia  of Ghana. 
16 October: PM Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho. 
16 October: meeting with Organisation of African Unity (OAU) representatives headed 
by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. 
16 October: President Kaunda of Zambia (separate from OAU meeting). 
20 October: while visiting UN in New York, met PMs Kamisese Mara of Fiji and Eisaku 
Sato of Japan. 
21 October: in New York met PMs Hugh Shearer of Jamaica and Jack Lynch of Ireland. 
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22 October: still in New York met Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Yahya 
Khan of Pakistan and the following PMs: Muhsin Ahmad al-Aini of theYemeni Arab 
Republic, Borg Olivier of Malta, Hilmar Baunsgard of Denmark and Abdou Didiaf of 
Senegal.  
23 October: UN Secretary-General U Thant, in New York. 
24 October: President Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus and PM Indira Ghandi of India, 
in New York; later attended state banquet for visiting leaders at the White House.   
28-29 October: President Albert Bongo of Gabon. 
4 November: PM Golda Meir of Israel. 
6 November: PM Seretse Khama of Botswana. 
12 November: President Georges Pompidou of France, in Paris (at funeral of Charles de 
Gaulle). 
4 December: King Hussein of Jordan. 
16 December: PM Pierre Trudeau of Canada, in Ottowa. 
17-18 December: President Richard Nixon in Washington. 
21 December: President Ne Win of Burma. 
 
1971 
7 January: President Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus, in Nicosia. 
8-9 January: President Yahya Khan of Pakistan in Pakistan 
10 January: PM Indira Gandhi of India, in New Delhi. 
11 January: PM Pierre Trudeau of Canada, in New Delhi. 
12 January: PM Tunku Abdul Rahmann of Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur. 
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13 January: PM Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, in Singapore. 
13 – 23 January: Commonwealth Conference, Singapore. 
25 January: President Hastings Banda of Malawi. 
4-6 April: Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany, in Bonn. 
14 April: PM Keith Holyoake of New Zealand. 
15-16 April: Five-power Conference on defence of Malaysia-Singapore: PMs of 
Malaysia (Tun Razak) and New Zealand (Keith Holyoake) were present and saw Heath 
individually. 
28 April: PM Kofi Busia of Ghana. 
30 April: Sultan of Brunei. 
14 June: Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman. 
6 May: Chancellor Brandt of West Germany. 
10 May: PM Seewoosagur Rangoolam of Mauritius. 
21 May: President Georges Pompidou of France, in Paris. 
9 June: PM Lynden Pindling of Bahamas. 
14 July: President Idi Amin of Uganda. 
27-28 July: PM Emilio Colombo of Italy. 
23 August: PM Hugh Shearer of Jamaica. 
24 August: PM Kofi Busia of Ghana. 
26 August: PM Hammar Deroburt of Nauru. 
6-7 September: PM Jack Lynch of Ireland. 
17-18 September: PM Dom Mintoff of Malta. 
20 September: Mario Brosio, Secretary-General of NATO. 
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26-28 September: Jack Lynch of Ireland (with Brian Faulkner, PM of Northern Ireland) 
5 October: PM James Mancham of the Seychelles. 
18 October: PM Souvanna Phouma of Laos. 
21 October: PM Mariano Rumor of Italy. 
25 October: PM Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka. 
31 October: PM Indira Gandhi of India. 
8 November: President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia. 
9 November: PM William McMahon of Australia. 
10 November: PM Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. 
11 November: PM Kofi Busia of Ghana. 
18-19 November: PM Otto Krag of Denmark.  
2 December: PM Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius. 
9 December: King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan (on state visit). 
17 December: PM Pierre Trudeau of Canada, in Ottowa. 
20-21 December: President Richard Nixon of US, in Bermuda (British territory). 
 
1972 
8 January: Mujib-ur-Rahmann, unofficial leader of ‘Bangladesh’. 
9 January: PM Trygve Bratteli of Norway. 
22-23 January: signature of Treaty of Accession to European Community, Paris. Heath 
met leaders of existing Community members (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, West Germany), Ireland and Denmark. 
28 January: President Hastings Banda of Malawi. 
 38 
14 February: Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Secretary-General of UNCTAD. 
22 February: PM Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius. 
24 February: Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria. 
6 March: PM Dom Mintoff of Malta. 
8 March: Nasir Assar, Secretary-General of Central Treaty Organisation. 
18-19 March: President Georges Pompidou of France. 
28 March: Joseph Luns, Secretary-General of NATO. 
10 April: Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of UN. 
20-21 April: Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany. 
2 May: PM Gaston Eyskens of Belgium. 
8-9 June: PM Otto Krag of Denmark, in Copenhagen. 
19 June: PM Seretse Khama of Botswana. 
21 June: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. 
23 June: Shah of Iran. 
29 June: President Leopold Senghor of Senegal. 
17 July: PM Errol Barrow of Barbados. 
8 August: President Ne Win of Burma. 
18 August: PM Mujib-ur-Rahmann of Bangladesh. 
22 August: Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman. 
4 September: Jack Lynch of Ireland, near Munich (which Heath visited 3-7 September at 
the time of the Olympic Games) 
5 September: Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany, near Munich. 
7 September: King Topou IV of Tonga. 
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12 September: Sheikh Zaid bin Al-Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates. 
13 September: PM Olaf Palme of Sweden. 
18-19 September: PM Kakuei Tanaka of Japan, in Tokyo. 
25 September: Arnold Smith, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. 
1 October: Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria. 
2-3 October: PM Giulio Andreotti of Italy, in Rome. 
4 October: Pope Paul VI, in the Vatican. 
8 October: Sicco Mansholt, President of European Commission. 
18-21 October: leaders of European Community members (Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, West Germany) and other members-elect (Ireland and 
Denmark), in Paris. 
24 November: PM Jack Lynch of Ireland. 
27 November: PM Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius. 
27 November: PM Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore. 
27 November: President Leopold Senghor of Senegal. 
3-4 December: PM Pierre Trudeau of Canada. 
19 December: PM Lynden Pindling of Bahamas. 
 
1973 
17 January: Sunthorn Hongladarom, Secretary-General of the South-East Asian Treaty 
Organisation. 
24 January, PM Barend Bieshuevel of Belgium, in London. 
1-2 February: President Richard Nixon of the US, in Washington and Camp David. 
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25 February: PM Kamisese Mara of Fiji. 
1-2 March: Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany, in Bonn. 
23 March: PM Liam Cosgrave of Ireland. 
4 April: President Luis Echeverria of Mexico (on state visit). 
10 April: President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam. 
24 April: PM Gough Whitlam of Australia. 
21-22 May: President Georges Pompidou of France, in Paris. 
29 May: Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany, in Bonn. 
13 June: President Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria (on state visit). 
25 June: PM Indira Gandhi of India. 
29 June: Arnold Smith, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.  
12 July: King Hussein of Jordan. 
16 July: PM Marcello Caetano of Portugal. 
22 July: Shah of Iran. 
24 July: PM Ali Bhutto of Pakistan. 
27 July: President Gaafar el-Nimiri of Sudan, on State Visit. 
2-8 August: Commonwealth Conference, Ottowa, Canada. 
11 September: Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman. 
12 September: Xavier Ortoli, President of European Commission. 
17 September: PM Liam Cosgrave of Ireland. 
18 September: Sheikh Kalifah bin Hamad al Thani, Emir of Qatar. 
19 September: PM Tun Razak of Malaysia. 
29 September-2 October: PM Kakuei Tanaka of Japan. 
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6-7 October: Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany. 
15-16 October: PM Olafur Johannesson of Iceland. 
25 October: President Leopold Senghor of Senegal. 
11 November: PM Dom Mintoff of Malta. 
11 November: PM Martin den Uyl of the Netherlands. 
12 November: Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany. 
12 November: PM Golda Meir of Israel. 
 (Note that the meetings of 11-12 November were with leaders attending a Socialist 
International conference in London). 
16-17 November: President Georges Pompidou of France. 
3 December: PM Edmond Leburton of Belgium, in Brussels. 
3 December: PM Pierre Werner of Luxembourg, in Brussels. 
6-9 December: PM Liam Cosgrave of Ireland, at Sunningdale, Berkshire (including 
Northern Ireland politicians). 
8-9 December: PM Mariano Rumor of Italy. 
12 December: PM Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius. 
14-15 December: European Community summit, Copenhagen. 
31 December: PM Pierre Trudeau of Canada, in Ottowa. (after funeral of former PM 
Lester Pearson) 
 
1974 
11 January: PM Michael Manley of Jamaica. 
3 February: King Hussein of Jordan. 
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Notes. 
I am grateful to Geoffrey Berridge and two anonymous readers for comments on the draft 
of this article. 
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